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Abstract—When security bugs are detected, they should be
(a) discussed privately by security software engineers; and
(b) not mentioned to the general public until security patches
are available. Software engineers usually report bugs to bug
tracking system, and label them as security bug reports (SBRs)
or not-security bug reports (NSBRs), while SBRs have a higher
priority to be fixed before exploited by attackers than NSBRs.
Yet suspected security bug reports are often publicly disclosed
because the mislabelling issues ( i.e., mislabel security bug reports
as not-security bug report).
The goal of this paper is to aid software developers to
better classify bug reports that identify security vulnerabilities
as security bug reports through parameter tuning of learners
and data pre-processor. Previous work has applied text analytics
and machine learning learners to classify which reported bugs
are security related. We improve on that work, as shown by our
analysis of five open source projects. We apply hyperparameter
optimization to (a) the control parameters of a learner; and
(b) the data pre-processing methods that handle the case where
the target class is a small fraction of all the data. We show
that optimizing the pre-processor is more useful than optimizing
the learners. We also show that improvements gained from our
approach can be very large. For example, using the same data
sets as recently analyzed by our baseline approach, we show
that adjusting the data pre-processing results in improvements
to classification recall of 35% to 65% (median to max) with
moderate increment of false positive rate.
Index Terms—Hyperparameter Optimization, Data imbalance,
Security Bug Report Classification
I. INTRODUCTION
This paper replicates, and improves, the FARSEC a se-
curity bug report classification method recently reported in
TSE’18 [1]. FARSEC found security bugs in five data sets with
median recalls of 15,33,23,17,38%. Our methods, applied to
the same data, achieve much larger recalls of 77,66,67,44,62%.
These better results were obtained after applying hyperparam-
eter optimization to the data pre-processing. Such hyperparam-
eter optimization has been used before in SE (e.g. for software
defect classification [2], [3] or effort estimation [4]). However,
to the best of our knowledge, this is the first paper to apply
hyperparameter optimization to security bug detection.
We explore security bug detection since, to say the least,
this a pressing current concern. Daily news reports reveal
increasingly sophisticated security breaches. As seen in those
reports, a single vulnerability can have devastating effects.
For example, a data breach of Equifax caused the personal
information of as many as 143 million Americans – or nearly
half the country – to be compromised [5]. The WannaCry
ransomware attack [6] crippled British medical emergency
rooms, delaying medical procedures for many patients.
Developers capture and document software bugs and issues
in bug reports which are submitted to bug tracking systems.
For example, the Mozilla bug database has maintained more
than 670,000 bug reports with 135 new bug reports added each
day [7]. Usually, when security bugs are detected, they should
be (a) discussed privately by security software engineers;
and (b) not mentioned to the general public until security
patches are available. Software engineering report bugs to bug
tracking systems. Submitted bug report is explicitly labeled as
a security bug report (SBR) or not-security bug report (NSBR).
It is important to find and fix SBRs before they can be
exploited. To that end, researchers have adopted techniques,
such as text mining, aiming at classifying bug reports accu-
rately [8]–[11]. One challenge faced by these techniques is that
some security bug reports are mislabelled as not-security bug
reports (which mainly results from a lack of security domain
knowledge, e.g., inappropriately using security cross words in
both security bug reports and not-security bug reports).
To address the mislabelling issue, several text mining based
classification models are proposed to distinguish security bug
reports from not-security bug reports [8] [9]. These approaches
mainly identified relevant keywords in bug reports as well as
features such as word frequency, which were then used in
building classification models. However, these models were
found to suffer from high false positive rate although they im-
proved bug report classification. Peters et al. further proposed
a text mining with irrelevancy pruning framework named
FARSEC [1]. In their approach, developers first identified
security related words. Next, they pruned away the irrelevant
bug reports (where “irrelevant” meant “does not have these
security-related keywords”). FARSEC was evaluated using bug
reports from Chromium and four Apaches projects.
The conjecture of this paper is that text mining-based bug
report classification approach (e.g., FARSEC) can be further
enhanced. For example, FARSEC applied its data miners
using their default “off-the-shelf” configurations. We propose
to apply hyperparameter optimization to the security bug
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report classification problem. Software engineering research
results show that hyperparameter optimization (to automati-
cally learn the “magic” control parameters of an algorithm)
can outperform “off-the-shelf” configurations [2], [3], [12]–
[16]. We distinguish and apply two kinds of hyperparamater
optimization:
• Learner hyperparamter optimization to adjust the param-
eters of the data miner; e.g. to learn how many trees to
use in random forest, or what values to use in the kernel
of a Support Vector Machine (SVM).
• Data pre-processor hyperparamater optimization to adjust
any adjustments to the training data, prior to learning; e.g.
to learn how to control outlier removal or, in our case,
how to handle the class imbalance problem. For example,
data sets from [1] show among the 45,940 bug reports,
only 0.8% belong to security bug reports.
This paper applies learner and pre-processor optimization to
vulnerability data sets as the state-of-the-art approach [1]. We
conduct experiments on bug reports from five open source
projects, i.e., one from the Chromium project, and four from
Apache projects (i.e., Wicket, Ambari, Camel, Derby). We
applied hyperparameter optimization to classification learners,
and a hybrid sampling data pre-processor called SMOTE to
address the class imbalance issue. We further propose to
apply a tuned version of SMOTE called SMOTUNED in
our experiment. Since FARSEC adopted several irrelevancy
pruning techniques (i.e., filters) on data sets to remove not-
security bug reports that contain security cross words, we also
experimented on the same processed data as FARSEC.
We propose to ask the following research questions:
RQ1. Can learner hyperparameter optimization technique improve
security bug report classification performance?
Using the same data as that of Peters et al. in the original
FARSEC paper, we find that, hyperparameter optimization
improves classification recall on 33 out of 40 filtering data
sets than using the “off-the-shelf” default configurations in
learners, with improvement from 8.6% to 4.5X.
RQ2. Is it better to optimize the learners or the data pre-
processors in security bug report classification?
The results from RQ1 were then compared to SMOTE and
SMOTUNED (i.e., applying hyperparameter optimization to
SMOTE). The improvements were seen with SMOTE and
SMOTUNED were larger than with learner’s hyperparamater
optimization. Further, those observed improvements were very
large indeed. Using the same data and text mining filtering
methods as Peters et al., we can show improvements to recall
of 35% to 65%, median to max (at the cost of very modest
increases in false alarm rates)
RQ3. What are the relative merits of irrelevancy pruning (e.g.,
filtering) vs hyperparamater optimization in security bug report
classification?
Our results show that with data pre-processing optimization,
there is no added benefit to FARSEC’s irrelevancy pruning.
However, in a result confirming the Peters et al. results, without
hyperparamater optimization, irrelevancy pruning does indeed
improve the performance of vulnerability classification. So
while we recommend data pre-processing optimization, if
analysts wish to avoid that added complexity, they should use
FARSEC’s irrelevancy pruning.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. We
introduce research background in Section II. In Section III,
we describe our method, including data, evaluation metrics and
experiment details. We answer proposed research questions in
section IV. We discuss the threats to validity in Section V.
We then present related work in Section VI and conclude in
Section VII.
II. BACKGROUND
A. On the Need for More Secure Software
As noted by the US National Institute of Standards and
Technology (NIST), “Current systems perform increasingly vi-
tal tasks and are widely known to possess vulnerabilities” [17].
Here, by a “vulnerability”, they mean a weakness in the
computational logic (e.g., code) found in software and some
hardware components (e.g., firmware) that, when exploited,
results in a negative impact on confidentiality, integrity, or
availability [18].
In their report to the White House Office of Science and
Technology Policy, “Dramatically Reducing Software Vulner-
abilities” [17], NIST officials urge the research community
to explore more technical approaches to reducing security
vulnerabilities. The need to reduce vulnerabilities is also
emphasized in the 2016 US Federal Cybersecurity Research
and Development Strategic Plan [19].
Experience shows that predicting for security vulnerabilities
is difficult (see §VI-A). Accordingly, this paper explores
text-mining on bug reports, augmented by hyperparameter
optimization and oversampling methods.
B. FARSEC: Extending Text Mining for Bug Reports
Recall that Peters et al. FARSEC’s approach added an
irrelevancy pruning step to text mining. Table I lists the pruners
explored in the FARSEC research. The purpose of filtering in
FARSEC is to remove not-security bug reports with security
related keywords. To achieve this goal, FARSEC applied an
algorithm that firstly calculated the probability of the keyword
TABLE I
DIFFERENT FILTERS USED IN FARSEC.
Filter Description
farsecsq Apply the Jalali et al. [20] support functionto the frequency of words found in SBRs
farsectwo Apply the Graham version [21] of multiplyingthe frequency by two.
farsec Apply no support function.
clni Apply CLNI filter to non-filtered data.
clnifarsec Apply CLNI filter to farsec filtered data.
clnifarsecsq Apply CLNI filter to farsecsq filtered data.
clnifarsectwo Apply CLNI filter to farsectwo filtered data.
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appearing in security bug report and not-security bug report,
and then calculated the score of the keyword.
Inspired by previous works [21] [20], several tricks were
also introduced in FARSEC to reduce false positives. For
example, FARSEC built the farsectwo pruner by multiplying
the frequency of not-security bug reports by two, aiming
to achieve a good bias. The farsecsq filter was created by
squaring the numerator of the support function to improve
heuristic ranking of low frequency evidence.
In addition, FARSEC also tested a noise detection algorithm
called CLNI (Closet List Noise Identification) [22]. Specifi-
cally, CLNI works as follows: During each iteration, for each
instance i, a list of closest instances are calculated and sorted
according to Euclidean Distance to instance i. The percentage
of top N instances with different class values is recorded. If
percentage value is larger or equal to a threshold, then instance
i is highly probable to be a noisy instance and thus included
to noise set S. This process is repeated until two noise sets Si
and Si−1 have the similarity over . A threshold score (e.g.,
0.75) is set to remove any non-buggy reports above the score.
C. Hyperparameter Optimization
In machine learning, model parameters are the properties
of training data that will learn on its own during training
by the classifiers, e.g., split point in CART [23]. Model
hyperparameters are values in machine learning models that
can require different constraints, weights or learning rates to
generate different data patterns, e.g., the number of neighbors
in K Nearest Neighbors (KNN) [24].
Hyperparameters are important because they directly control
the behaviors of the training algorithms and impact the per-
formance of the models being trained. Choosing appropriate
hyperparameters plays a critical role in the performance of
machine learning models. Hyperparameter optimization is the
process of searching the most optimal hyperparameters in
machine learning learners [25] [26]. There are several kinds of
hyperparameter optimization algorithms, including grid search,
random search, and Bayesian optimization.
Grid search [27] [28] is a “brute force” hyperparameter
optimizer that wraps a learner in a for-loops that walk through
a wide range of all a learner’s control parameters. Simple
to implement, it suffers from the “curse of dimensionality”.
That is, after just a handful of options, grid search can miss
important optimizations [29]. Worse still, much CPU can be
wasted during grid search since experience has shown that only
a few ranges within a few tuning parameters really matter [30].
Random search [30] stochastically samples the search space
and evaluates sets from a specified probability distribution.
Evolutionary algorithms are a variant of random search that
runs in “generations” where each new generation is seeded
from the best examples selected from the last generation [31].
Simulated annealing is a special form of evolutionary al-
gorithms where the population size is one [32] [33]. The
drawback of using random search algorithm is that it does
not use information from prior experiment to select the next
set and also it is very difficult to predict the next set of
experiments.
Bayesian optimization [34] works by assuming the unknown
function was sampled from a Gaussian Process and maintains a
posterior distribution for this function as observation is made.
Bayesian optimizers reflect on their distributions to propose
the most informative guess about where to sample next.
Such optimizers might be best-suited for optimization over
continuous domains with a small number of dimensions [35].
All the above algorithms have proven useful in their home
domains. But for software engineering, certain algorithms
such as differential evolution (DE) [36] are known to run
very quickly and deliver useful results [29] [12] [37]. Also,
DE has been proven useful in prior software engineering
tuning studies [2]. Further, other evolutionary algorithms (e.g.,
genetic algorithms [31], simulated annealing [32]) mutate each
attribute in isolation. When two attributes are correlated, those
algorithms can mutate variables inappropriately in different
directions. DE, on the other hand, mutates attributes in tandem
along with known data trends. Hence, DE’s tandem search can
outperform other optimizers such as (a) particle swarm opti-
mization [38]; (b) the grid search used by Tantithamthavorn et
al. [14] to tune their defect predictors [29]; or (c) the genetic
algorithm used by Panichella et al. [39] to tune a text miner.
The premise of DE is that the best way to mutate the
existing tunings is to extrapolate between current solutions.
Three solutions a, b, c are selected at random. For each tuning
parameter k, at some probability cr, we replace the old tuning
xk with yk. For booleans yk = ¬xk and for numerics,
yk = ak + f × (bk − ck) where f is a parameter controlling
differential weight. DE loops g times over the population of
size np, replacing old items with new candidates (if new
candidate is better). This means that, as the loop progresses,
the population is full of increasingly more valuable solutions
(which, in turn, helps extrapolation). As to the control pa-
rameters of DE, using advice from a DE user group1, we
set {np, f , cr} = {10n, 0.8, 0.9}, where n are the number of
parameters to tune. Note that we set the number of iteration
{g} to 3, 10, which are denoted as DE3 and DE10 respectively.
A small number (3) is used to test the effects of a very CPU-
light effort estimator. A larger number (10) is selected to
check if anything is lost by restricting the inference to small
iterations.
D. Data Balancing
Many data sets exhibit highly imbalanced class frequencies
(e.g., fake reviews in Amazon, fraudulent credit card charges,
security bug reports). In these cases, only a small fraction
of observations are actually positive because of the scarce
occurrence of those events. In the field of data mining, such
a phenomenon makes classification models difficult to detect
rare events [40]. Both misclassification and failing to identify
rare events may result in poor performance by predictors.
1http://cci.lbl.gov/cctbx sources/scitbx/differential evolution.py
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Fig. 1. An illustration on how the SMOTE technique works.
One technique to tackle the imbalanced class issue is based
on the sampling approach [41]. There are three ways to
resample imbalanced data sets [42]–[45]:
• Oversampling to make more of the minority class;
• Undersampling to remove majority class items;
• Some hybrid of the first two.
Machine learning researchers [41] advise that undersam-
pling can work better than oversampling if there are hundreds
of minority observations in the datasets. When there are only
a few dozen minority instances, oversampling approaches are
superior to undersampling. In the case of large size of training
samples, the hybrid methods would be a better choice.
The Synthetic Minority Oversampling TEchnique, also
known as SMOTE [42], is a hybrid algorithm that performs
both over- and under-sampling. In oversampling, SMOTE
calculates the k nearest neighbors for each minority class
samples. Depending on the amount of oversampling required,
one or more of the k-nearest neighbors are picked to create
the synthetic samples. This amount is usually denoted by
oversampling percentage (e.g., 50% by default). The next
step is to randomly create a synthetic sample along the line
connecting two minority samples. This can be illustrated in
Figure 1 where the blue dots represent the minority class
sample, and the red dots represent the synthetic samples.
In undersampling, SMOTE just removes majority samples
randomly.
Algorithm 1 shows the SMOTE algorithm and Table II
shows the “magic” parameters that control SMOTE. The best
settings for these magic parameters are often domain-specific.
SMOTUNED [3] is a tuned version of SMOTE that uses DE to
learn good settings for the Table II parameters. SMOTUNED
will serve as our optimizer for data pre-processing to handle
data imbalance for security bug classification.
Before leaving this description of SMOTE, we make one im-
portant methodological point. Data mining algorithms should
be assessed on the kinds of data they might see in the future.
Algorithm 1 Pseudocode of SMOTE From [37].
1def SMOTE(k=2, m=50%, r=2): # defaults
2while Majority > m do
3delete any majority sample
4while Minority < m do
5add synthetic samples
6
7def synthetic samples(X0):
8relevant = emptySet
9k1 = 0
10while(k1++ < 20) and size(relevant) < k {
11all = k1 nearest neighbors of X0
12relevant += item in all of X0 class
13}
14Z = any of relevant
15Y = interpolate(X0, Z)
16return Y
17
18def minkowski distance(a, b, r):
19return (Σiabs(ai − bi)r)1/r
That is, data miners should be tested on data that has naturally
occurring class distributions. Hence, while applying SMOTE
(or SMOTUNED) to the training data is good practice, it is
a bad practice to apply SMOTE to the testing data.
E. Machine Learning Algorithms
Once SMOTE, or SMOTUED terminates, the resulting data
must be processed by a data miner. This study using the same
five machine learning learners as seen in the FARSEC study,
i.e., Random Forest, Naive Bayes, Logistic Regression, Mul-
tilayer Perceptron and K Nearest Neighbor. They are widely
used for software engineering classification problems [46]. We
now give a brief description of each algorithm.
Random Forest. Random forests [47] are an ensemble
learning that combines multiple weaker learners into a stronger
learner. Breiman argues that such random forests have better
generalization are less susceptible to over-fitting [48]. There
are several advantages of random forest, e.g. it can be used
for both classification and regression problems, and it is easy
to measure the relative importance of each feature on the
classification.
Naive Bayes. Naive Bayes [49] keep statistics on each
column of data in each class. New examples are classified
by a statistical analysis that reports the class that is closest
to the test case. Naive Bayes classifiers are computationally
efficient and tend to perform well on relatively small data sets.
Logistic Regression. Logistic regression [50] is a classifi-
cation model that works well on linearly separable classes, and
it is one of the most widely used algorithms for classification
in industry (e.g., weather forecasting). In general, logistic
regression could be viewed as a probability estimation. A
threshold can be set to predict the class a data belongs.
Based upon the threshold, the obtained estimated probability
is classified into classes. The decision boundary of logistic
regression can be linear or non-linear.
Multilayer Perceptron. Multilayer perceptron [51] is an
artificial neural network which is composed of multiple per-
ceptrons. A perceptron is a single neuron model that is a
precursor to larger neural networks. An input layer receives
the signal and an output layer makes the classification about
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the input. Between the input layer and the output layer, an
arbitrary number of hidden layers act as the computational
engine. In a sense, multilayer perceptron learns a mapping
of the input training data, and best relate it to the predicted
output.
K Nearest Neighbor. K nearest neighbor classifier [24] is
one of the simplest predictive models. When classifying a new
element, nearest neighbor classifier checks in the training data
for K objects close to the element (i.e., K nearest neighbors).
The classifier returns the class by majority voting among its
neighbors. K nearest neighbor is a typical “lazy learner” since
it does not learn a discriminative function from the training
data but just memorizes the training data instead.
F. Hyperparameter Tuning Range of Learners
We implement our hyperparameter optimization techniques
in scikit-learn [52]. We choose scikit-learn because it inte-
grates various well-defined classification learners as well as
many configurations that we can choose. We select a group of
hyperparameters for each learner in scikit-learn for the purpose
of optimization. Table II lists all the hyperparameters we
select. We choose these “tuning range” for several reasons: (1)
These ranges include the default value. (2) We could achieve
a large gains in performance of our vulnerability predictors
by exploring these ranges. (3) These ranges are sufficient in
tuning for this work.
Besides, Table III shows the DE control parameters used in
this paper. This table was generated by combining the advice
at the end of §II-C with Table II.
III. METHODS
A. Experimental Rig
The results of this paper come from a 10-way cross-
validation. After dividing each training data into B = 10
bins, we tested our models using bin Bi after training them
on data −Bi. The 10-way cross-validation is used to pick the
best candidate learner with the highest performance for that
TABLE III
LIST OF PARAMETERS IN DE ALGORITHM FOR DIFFERENT LEARNERS AND
PRE-PROCESSOR.
DE ParameterLearner & Pre-processor NP F CR ITER
Random Forest 60
Logistic Regression 30
Multilayer Perceptron 60
K Nearest Neighbor 20
Naive Bayes 10
0.8 0.9 3, 10
SMOTE 30 0.8 0.9 10
data set. We then train the candidate learner with the whole
training data set, and test on the separate testing data set as
FARSEC.
This 10-way process was applied to five projects (described
in the next section); the five learners listed above; and the
following eight data pruning operators:
• train; i.e. no data pruning;
• The seven variations of farsec and clni listed in Table I.
That is, we ran our learners 2000 times:
5 projects ∗ 8 pruners ∗ 5 learners ∗ 10 ways
Note that FARSEC experimented on bug reports from five
open source projects, i.e., one Chromium project and four
Apache projects (i.e., Wicket, Ambari, Camel and Derby).
Table IV shows the data imbalanced characteristics of the bug
reports.
B. Evaluation Metrics
To understand the open issues with vulnerability classifica-
tion, firstly we must define how they are assessed. If (TN, FN,
FP, TP) are the true negatives, false negatives, false positives,
and true positives, respectively, found by a detector, then:
• prec = Precision = TP/(TP+FP), the percentage of the
predicted vulnerabilities that are actual vulnerabilities;
• pd = Recall = TP/(TP+FN), the percentage of the actual
vulnerabilities that are predicted to be vulnerabilities;
TABLE II
LIST OF HYPERPARAMETERS OPTIMIZED IN DIFFERENT LEARNERS AND PRE-PROCESSOR.
Learner & Pre-processor Parameters Default Tuning Range Description
Random Forest
n estimators 10 [10,150] The number of trees in the forest.
min samples leaf 1 [1,20] The minimum number of samples required to be at a leaf node.
min samples split 2 [2,20] The minimum number of samples required to split an internal node.
max leaf nodes None [2,50] Grow trees with max leaf nodes in best-first fashion.
max features auto [0.01,1] The number of features to consider when looking for the best split
max depth None [1,10] The maximum depth of the tree.
Logistic Regression
C 1.0 [1.0,10.0] Inverse of regularization strength.
max iter 100 [50,200] Useful only for the newton-cg, sag and lbfgs solvers.
verbose 0 [0,10] For the liblinear and lbfgs solvers set verbose to any positive number for verbosity.
Multilayer Perceptron
alpha 0.0001 [0.0001,0.001] L2 penalty (regularization term) parameter.
learning rate init 0.001 [0.001,0.01] The initial learning rate used.
power t 0.5 [0.1,1] The exponent for inverse scaling learning rate.
max iter 200 [50,300] Maximum number of iterations.
momentum 0.9 [0.1,1] Momentum for gradient descent update.
n iter no change 10 [1,100] Maximum number of epochs to not meet tol improvement.
K Nearest Neighbor leaf size 30 [10,100] Leaf size passed to BallTree or KDTree.n neighbors 5 [1,10] Number of neighbors to use by default for kneighbors queries.
Naive Bayes var smoothing 1e-9 [0.0,1.0] Portion of the largest variance of all features that is added to variances for calculation stability.
SMOTE
k 5 [1,20] Number of neighbors.
m 50% [50, 400] Number of synthetic examples to create. Expressed as a percent of final training data.
r 2 [1,6] Power parameter for the Minkowski distance metric.
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TABLE IV
IMBALANCED CHARACTERISTICS OF BUG REPORT DATA SETS FROM
FARSEC.
#Security #Bug Percent
Project Filter Bugs reports buggy
Chromium
train
77
20970 0.4
farsecsq 14219 0.5
farsectwo 20968 0.4
farsec 20969 0.4
clni 20154 0.4
clnifarsecsq 13705 0.6
clnifarsectwo 20152 0.4
clnifarsec 20153 0.4
Wicket
train
4
500 0.8
farsecsq 136 2.9
farsectwo 143 2.8
farsec 302 1.3
clni 392 1.0
clnifarsecsq 46 8.7
clnifarsectwo 49 8.2
clnifarsec 196 2.0
Ambari
train
22
500 4.4
farsecsq 149 14.8
farsectwo 260 8.5
farsec 462 4.8
clni 409 5.4
clnifarsecsq 76 28.9
clnifarsectwo 181 12.2
clnifarsec 376 5.9
Camel
train
14
500 2.8
farsecsq 116 12.1
farsectwo 203 6.9
farsec 470 3.0
clni 440 3.2
clnifarsecsq 71 19.7
clnifarsectwo 151 9.3
clnifarsec 410 3.4
Derby
train
46
500 9.2
farsecsq 57 80.7
farsectwo 185 24.9
farsec 489 9.4
clni 446 10.3
clnifarsecsq 48 95.8
clnifarsectwo 168 27.4
clnifarsec 435 10.6
• pf = False Alarms = FP/(FP+TN), the percentage of the
non-vulnerable artifacts that are reported as vulnerable;
This paper adopts the same evaluation criteria of the original
FARSEC paper; i.e. the recall (pd) and false alarm (pf)
measures. Also, to control the optimization of differential
evolution algorithm, we instructed it to minimize false alarms
while maximizing recall. To achieve those goals, we told DE
to maximize the g-measure which is the harmonic mean of
recall and the compliment of false alarms.
g =
2× pd × (1− pf )
pd + (1− pf )
Note that g is maximal when both recall (pd) is high and false
alarm (pf) is low.
C. Statistics
This study ranks treatments using the Scott-Knott procedure
recommended by Mittas & Angelis in their 2013 IEEE TSE
paper [53]. This method sorts results from different treatments,
then splits them in order to maximize the expected value
of differences in the observed performances before and after
divisions. For lists l,m, n of size ls,ms,ns where l = m∪n,
the “best” division maximizes E(∆); i.e. the difference in the
expected mean value before and after the spit:
E(∆) =
ms
ls
abs(m.µ− l.µ)2 + ns
ls
abs(n.µ− l.µ)2
Scott-Knott then checks if that “best” division is actually use-
ful. To implement that check, Scott-Knott would apply some
statistical hypothesis test H to check if m,n are significantly
different (and if so, Scott-Knott then recurses on each half
of the “best” division). For this study, our hypothesis test H
was a conjunction of the A12 effect size test of and non-
parametric bootstrap sampling; i.e. our Scott-Knott divided the
data if both bootstrapping and an effect size test agreed that
the division was statistically significant (95% confidence) and
not a “small” effect (A12 ≥ 0.6).
For a justification of the use of non-parametric bootstrap-
ping, see Efron & Tibshirani [54, p220-223]. For a justification
of the use of effect size tests see Kampenes [55] who warn
that even if a hypothesis test declares two populations to be
“significantly” different, then that result is misleading if the
“effect size” is very small. Hence, to assess the performance
differences we first must rule out small effects. Vargha and
Delaney’s non-parametric A12 effect size test explores two
lists M and N of size m and n:
A12 =
 ∑
x∈M,y∈N
{
1 if x > y
0.5 if x == y
 /(mn)
This expression computes the probability that numbers in
one sample are bigger than in another. This test was endorsed
by Arcuri and Briand [56].
Table V presents the reports of our Scott-Knott procedure
for each project data set. These results are discussed, exten-
sively, over the next two pages. Before that, we address one
detail. The “Learner” column of that table shows what data
miner was found to give the best results for a particular data
set/filter combination. Overall, there is no single best learner.
That is, when commissioning a vulnerability predictor in a
new context, it is important to try a range of different data
mining algorithms.
That said, we note from Table V that nearest neighbor
methods and multi-layer perceptrons (KNN and MLP) appear
less often in this table than Bayesian, regression, or tree-based
learners (NB, LR, RF). That is, if engineers wanted to restrict
the space of learners they explore, then, they could elect to
ignore KNN and MLP.
IV. RESULTS
We now answer our research questions:
RQ1. Can learner hyperparameter optimization technique im-
proves security bug report classification performance?
Table V reports results with and without hyperparameter
optimization of the pre-processor or learners. In the table, in
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TABLE V
RECALL AND FALSE POSITIVE RESULTS FROM FARSEC, DEFAULT SCIKIT-LEARN AND DE TUNING WITH SCIKIT-LEARN., SMOTE WITH SCIKIT-LEARN
AND SMOTUNED WITH SCIKIT-LEARN. IN THESE RESULTS, higher RECALLS (A.K.A. PD) ARE better. ALSO, lower FALSE ALARMS (A.K.A. PF) ARE
better. CELLS SHOWN IN GRAY REPORT A STATISTICAL COMPARISON OF ALL THE RECALL (A.K.A. PD) RESULTS. IN ANY ROW, ALL THE “BEST” RECALL
RESULTS ARE COLORED IN GRAY (AND BY “BEST”, WE MEAN THOSE RESULTS THAT APPEAR IN THE TOP-RANK OF A STATISTICAL SCOTT-KNOT TEST
FOR STATISTICAL SIGNIFICANCE AND NON-TRIVAL EFFECT SIZE).
FARSEC
(“off-the-shelf” WEKA)
Learning Tuning
(Scikit-learn)
SMOTE
(Scikit-learn)
SMOTUNED
(Scikit-learn)Project Filter Learner pd pf Learner pd pf Learner pd pf Learner pd pf
train LR 15.7 0.2 NB 46.9 6.8 NB 68.7 24.1 MP 73.9 17.8
farsecsq RF 14.8 0.3 LR 64.3 10.3 NB 80.0 31.5 LR 84.3 25.1
farsectwo LR 15.7 0.2 NB 40.9 6.5 RF 78.3 27.6 RF 77.4 23.1
farsec LR 15.7 0.2 NB 46.1 6.9 RF 80.8 36.1 MP 72.2 14.9
clni LR 15.7 0.2 NB 30.4 4.1 NB 74.8 24.8 MP 72.2 13.6
clnifarsecsq MP 49.6 3.8 MP 72.2 14.2 NB 82.6 30.4 LR 86.1 25.6
clnifarsectwo LR 15.7 0.2 NB 50.4 7.0 NB 79.1 29.9 MP 74.8 12.8
Chromium
clnifarsec LR 15.7 0.2 NB 47.8 10.4 NB 78.3 29 MP 74.7 17.1
train NB 16.7 7.1 NB 0.0 5.1 NB 66.7 32 NB 66.7 12.1
farsecsq LR 66.7 38.3 NB 50.0 44.5 NB 83.3 71.3 NB 83.3 66.8
farsectwo LR 66.7 36.6 NB 50.0 42.3 NB 66.7 68.2 NB 66.7 62.9
farsec LR 33.3 8.1 NB 66.7 23.1 NB 66.7 43.9 NB 66.7 26.1
clni NB 0.0 5.5 MP 16.7 2.4 NB 50.0 21.1 NB 50.0 12.5
clnifarsecsq LR 33.3 25.5 NB 83.3 66.8 NB 83.3 66.8 NB 83.3 66.8
clnifarsectwo LR 33.3 27.7 NB 50.0 39.9 NB 66.7 61.3 NB 66.7 61.3
Wicket
clnifarsec LR 50.0 10.5 NB 66.7 23.1 NB 66.7 38.9 NB 66.7 22.9
train MP 14.3 1.6 LR 28.6 0.8 LR 57.1 20.1 RF 57.1 10.8
farsecsq RF 42.9 14.4 RF 57.1 2.8 LR 57.1 30.4 RF 57.1 17.2
farsectwo RF 57.1 3.0 RF 57.1 2.8 RF 57.1 22.1 RF 57.1 17.8
farsec MP 14.3 4.9 RF 57.1 2.0 LR 57.1 19.9 NB 57.1 7.1
clni MP 14.3 2.6 LR 28.6 0.8 LR 57.1 12.4 LR 57.1 8.9
clnifarsecsq RF 57.1 7.7 RF 57.1 2.4 RF 57.1 13.4 RF 57.1 7.1
clnifarsectwo RF 28.6 4.5 RF 57.1 2.8 RF 57.1 13.0 RF 57.1 5.1
Ambari
clnifarsec RF 14.3 0.0 RF 57.1 2.4 RF 57.1 7.9 RF 57.1 3.9
train LR 11.1 3.5 MP 16.7 1.5 NB 33.3 27.4 NB 44.4 35.9
farsecsq RF 16.7 11.4 RF 44.4 24.7 RF 44.4 20.5 RF 55.6 23.4
farsectwo LR 50.0 41.8 RF 44.4 17.6 NB 61.1 71.0 NB 61.1 53.1
farsec LR 16.7 6.9 NB 22.2 12.4 NB 33.3 39.4 NB 33.3 28.0
clni NB 16.7 12.3 NB 16.7 7.9 NB 33.3 33.6 NB 38.9 35.3
clnifarsecsq MP 16.7 13.9 RF 38.9 14.9 RF 27.8 12.4 RF 33.3 15.6
clnifarsectwo MP 11.1 7.7 NB 61.1 50.0 NB 72.2 64.9 NB 61.1 51.9
Camel
clnifarsec LR 16.7 5.0 NB 22.2 11.6 LR 33.3 24.9 NB 38.9 34.4
train NB 38.1 6.8 NB 47.6 39.3 NB 54.7 22.2 MP 59.5 20.7
farsecsq KNN 54.8 29.9 KNN 59.5 40.6 RF 54.7 51.7 RF 66.7 51.5
farsectwo RF 47.6 12.4 LR 59.5 24.2 RF 47.6 27.9 MP 66.7 33.6
farsec NB 38.1 6.3 NB 47.6 4.1 NB 57.1 21.0 MP 59.5 19.0
clni RF 23.8 0.4 NB 45.2 3.5 NB 57.7 16.8 MP 61.9 24.5
clnifarsecsq KNN 54.8 29.9 KNN 59.5 42.4 RF 76.2 74.7 RF 69.0 65.1
clnifarsectwo RF 35.7 9.2 LR 59.5 24.2 RF 54.8 36.5 LR 61.9 30.3
Derby
clnifarsec NB 38.1 6.8 NB 47.6 3.9 NB 61.9 28.8 NB 57.1 10.9
each row, the gray highlights show all results ranked “best”
by a statistical Scott-Knot test. Note that:
• FARSEC rarely achieves best results. In fact, when we
compare the hyperparameter optimization technique on
learners with FARSEC, we are able to see that the former
improves the recall on 33 out of 40 filtering data sets with
improvement from 8.6% to 4.5X.
• Tuning the learners sometimes produces results that are
as good as the best.
• But most of the best results come from methods that pre-
process the data. Further, tuning the pre-processor (in
the SMOTUNED column) most often leads to the best
results.
Figure 2 visualizes the changes achieved by the new methods
of this paper. The changes on y-axis are relative to the
FARSEC results (so a positive value means that the treatment
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TABLE VII
A COMPARISON OF BEST RESULT FOR EACH PROJECT BETWEEN SMOTE
AND SMOTUNED.
SMOTE (Best) SMOTUNED (Best)Project pd pf pd pf
Chromium 80.8 24.1 86.1 13.6
Wicket 83.3 21.1 83.3 12.1
Ambari 57.1 7.9 57.1 3.9
Camel 72.2 12.4 61.1 15.6
Derby 76.2 16.8 66.7 10.9
is scoring larger values than FARSEC). The overall picture
offered by Figure 2 is that:
• The “DE” treatment (that only tunes the data miners) does
not improve recall (a.k.a. pd) as much as SMOTE/SMO-
TUNED.
• The SMOTE/SMOTUNED treatments lead to similar
improvements in recall;
• And SMOTUNED do so with a lower false alarm rate.
Several other aspects of Figure 2 deserve some comments:
• The DE results (which come from the Learning Tuning
columns of Table V) have the smallest additional false
alarm. This is not particularly encouraging, given that the
increase in recall/pd seen in the top plot is worse than any
other method.
• The pf changes resulting from SMOTUNED results are
relatively minor compared to the improvements seen
in recall/pd. Comparing the values in the two plots of
Figure 2, we see that the median pd improvement of 35%
has a median pf increase of only 18% (i.e. nearly less than
half). Also, when going to the maximum values (shown
at the right of these plots), we see the maximum pd
improvement of SMOTUNED is 62%. This is far greater
than the maximum pf increase only 38%.
In summary, hyperparameter optimization technique improves
vulnerability classification performance. Further, the best re-
sults for recall/pd come from tuning the data pre-processor
and not the data miner. This comes at the cost of a relatively
minor increase in the false alarm rate.
RQ2. Is it best to optimize the learners or the data pre-processors
in security bug report classification?
The previous research question showed that off-the-shelf
FARSEC could be improved by hyperparameter optimization.
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Fig. 2. Delta between the FARSEC results and the other treatments explored
in this paper. The changes in pd and pf shown on the y-axis are relative to the
the FARSEC results. All these values are positive; i.e. all the new treatments
of this paper perform much better recall/pd than FARSEC.
This research question ignores FARSEC and asks if optimizing
the learner is better than optimizing the preprocessing.
To answer that question, we look closer that the recall results
across the 40 rows on Table V. Specifically, we look at the rank
that our statistical Scott-Knot test assigns to Learning Tuning.
If we count how often any of the SMOTE/SMOTUNED results
were ranked worse than Learning Tuning, we see that:
• In 4/40 cases, SMOTE/SMOTUNED is ranked worse
than Learning Tuning;
• In 9/40 cases, SMOTE/SMOTUNED is ranked the same
as Learning Tuning;
• In the remaining 27/40 cases, SMOTE/SMOTUNED is
ranked higher than Learning Tuning.
Hence, we recommend tuning the data pre-processor over
tuning the learners.
In our experiment, for each project, we took care to use the
same testing dataset. Therefore, we could pick and compare
the best filtering result from SMOTE and SMOTUNED for
each data set. Table VII shows the best method (with highest
pd) seen for SMOTE and SMOTUNED for across the ten rows
of each data set. In three of our five data sets, SMOTUNED
TABLE VI
AVERAGE RUNTIME (IN MINUTE) OF TUNING DIFFERENT LEARNERS’ HYPERPARAMETERS AND SMOTE’S HYPERPARAMETERS.
DE3 DE10 SMOTUNEDProject NB RF MP LR KNN NB RF MP LR KNN NB RF MP LR KNN
Chromium <1 14 288 <1 151 <1 39 435 4 398 <1 <1 6 <1 11
Wicket <1 <1 4 <1 <1 <1 2 6 <1 <1 <1 <1 4 <1 <1
Ambari <1 <1 4 <1 <1 <1 2 6 <1 <1 <1 <1 4 <1 <1
Camel <1 <1 4 <1 <1 <1 2 6 <1 <1 <1 <1 4 <1 <1
Derby <1 <1 4 <1 <1 <1 2 6 <1 <1 <1 <1 4 <1 <1
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performs better than SMOTE. Specifically, for Chromium,
SMOTUNED has better pd and pf values. Also, for Wicket
and Ambrai, SMOTUNED has better pf values; Hence, given
this evidence and Figure 2, we recommend SMOTUNED over
SMOTE (but in the future, when more data is available, we
should revisit that conclusion).
Figure 3 visualizes the overall improvements in pf and recall
(a.k.a. pd) achieved by SMOTUNED. This plot shows the
absolute performance the best methods of this paper (SMO-
TUNED) compared to the prior state of the art (FARSEC).
Note that the median performance scores for FARSEC and
not so impressive (pd=20%) while the SMOTUNED recalls are
much better (pd=63%). These improvements come at relatively
minor cost (median false alarm rate of 7% for FARSEC and
18% for SMOTUNED).
Two objections to this endorsement of SMOTUNED for
vulnerability classification might be:
• The runtime cost of tuning. Hyperparameter optimization
can be a slow process. However, as shown in Table VI,
the CPU costs for the methods of this paper are not
excessive (exception: as seen in Table VI, KNN and MLP
can be very slow to tune. However, since these were
rarely selected as a “best” learner in Table V, we would
recommend not using those learners for vulnerability
classification.
• The complexity of building and applying the hyperpa-
rameter optimizer. In our experience, it was not hard to
implement a DE algorithm and apply it to vulnerability
classification. Indeed, one of the advantages of DEs is
that they are very simple to build. Nevertheless, for those
that want to avoid that (very small) additional complexity,
we offer them the advice from our answer to RQ3.
RQ3. What are the relative merits of irrelevancy pruning (e.g.,
filtering) vs hyperparamater optimization for security bug report
classification for security bug report classification?
Our results show that with data pre-processing optimization,
there is no added benefit to FARCECs irrelevancy pruning.
That said, the train pd results in the FARSEC column of
Table V are usually smaller than the other values seen after
applying some of the filters proposed by Peters et al. This
result confirms the Peters et al. results; i,e, without hyperpa-
rameter optimization, irrelevancy pruning does indeed improve
the performance of vulnerability classification.
Hence, while we recommend data pre-processing optimiza-
tion, if analysts wish to avoid that added complexity, they
should use FARSECs irrelevancy pruning.
V. THREATS TO VALIDITY
As to any empirical study, biases can affect the final
results. Therefore, conclusions drawn from this work must be
considered with threats to validity in mind. In this section, we
discuss the validity of our work.
Sampling Bias. Sampling bias threatens any classification
experiments, and what matters here may not be true there. For
example, the data sets used here come from FARSEC, i.e.,
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Fig. 3. Top row: changes in pd and pf values among DE, SMOTE and
SMOTUNED (compared to FARSEC). Bottom row: A comparison of pd and
pf values between FARSEC and SMOTUNED.
one chromium project and four Apache projects in different
application domains. Bug report from the chromium project
is only a subset of the project, and the bug reports from
four Apache projects are generated by JIRA which is used
as the bug tracking system. In addition, the bug reports
from Apache projects are randomly selected with a BUG or
IMPROVEMENT label for each project.
Learner Bias. Classification is a large and active field. Lots
of different machine learning algorithms have been developed
to solve different classification problem tasks. An important
note from David Wolpert is the “No Free Lunch Theorems”,
i.e., there is no one learner working for all problems. One
reason for this is that each classification has its inherent
biases. Any study can only use a small subset of the known
classification algorithms. In this work, we do not explore the
performance of different classification learners. To compare
the work with FARSEC, we use the same learners as Peters
did in their work.
Evaluation Bias. On the one hand, during our evaluation,
we repeat our work 10 times and report the median perfor-
mance results for different learners. On the other hand, we only
set two versions of generations (i.e., 3 and 10) for learners and
one version of generation (i.e., 10) for SMOTE in differential
evolution algorithm. Larger number of generations could be
further explored, but with more CPU efforts and time.
Input Bias. In hyperparameter optimization and preprocess-
ing tuning with differential evolution algorithm, we choose
a subset of hyperparameters for each learner, and set range
boundaries for both learners and SMOTE. Different input
values can result in different outputs, we choose these ranges
as we explain in Section II-C, and we do not explore large
range in this study which is not the focus of the work.
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VI. RELATED WORK
A. Mining Bug Reports
Text mining (also known as Text Analytics) is the pro-
cess of exploring and analyzing massive sets of unstructured
(e.g., word documents) or semi-structured (e.g., XML and
JSON) text data, in order to identify concepts, patterns, topics
and other attributes in the data [57]. To pre-process the
textual content, several steps such as tokenization, filtering,
lemmatization, stop-words removal and stemming are usually
leveraged [58].
Text mining has recently been widely applied in bug report
analysis, such as identification of duplicated bug reports [59]–
[62], prediction of the severity or impact of a reported
bug [63]–[67], extraction of execution commands and input
parameters from performance bug reports [68], assignment
of the priority labels to bug reports [69], bug report field
reassignment and refinement prediction [11].
In particular, a few studies of bug report classification are
more relevant to our work. Some of those approaches focus
on building bug classification models based on analyzing
bug reports with text mining. For example, Zhou et al. [70]
leveraged text mining techniques, analyzed the summary parts
of bug reports and fed into machine learners. Xia et al [10]
developed a framework that applied text mining technology on
bug reports, and trained a model on bug reports with known
labels (i.e., configuration or non-configuration). The trained
model was used to predict the new bug reports. Popstojanova
et al. [9] used different types of textual feature vectors
and focused on applying both supervised and unsupervised
algorithms in classifying security and non-security related bug
reports. Wijayasekara et al. [71] extracted textual information
by utilizing the textual description of the bug reports. A feature
vector was generated through the textual information, and then
presented to a machine learning classifier.
Some other approaches use a more heuristic way to identify
bug reports. For example, Zaman et al. [72] combined key-
word searching and statistical sampling to distinguish between
performance bugs and security bugs in Firefox bug reports.
Gegick et al. [8] proposed a technique to identify security bug
reports based on keyword mining, and performed an empirical
study based on an industry bug repository.
B. Pre-processor Optimization
Agrawal et al. [3] report similar results to those seen in
RQ2. They also report that data pre-processor optimization
does better than leaner optimization – which they summarize
as “better data” does better than “better learners”.
While Argawal et al. might have predicted our RQ2 result,
there are many reasons to believe that such a prediction could
be incorrect. Argawal et al. only studied defect classification
and methods that work for defect classification usually do not
work for vulnerability classification. The historical record is
very clear on this point. As shown in §VI-A, when defect
classification methods are applied to vulnerability classifica-
tion, they do not perform very well. This is because the kinds
of data explored by defect classification and vulnerability
classification are very different. The vulnerability frequencies
reported in the Introduction (1-4% of files) are very common.
Yet defect classification usually is performed on data with
much larger target classes. For example, the defect data in
a recent defect classification modeling (DPM) paper used 11
data sets with median number of files with defects of 34% [73].
Hence we say that prior to this paper, it was an open
question if methods (like those of Agrawal et al.) which
are certified for one kind of software engineering problem
(defect classification) work for a very different kind of problem
(vulnerability classification).
VII. CONCLUSION
Security vulnerabilities are a pressing problem that threatens
not only the viability of software services, but also consumer
confidence in those services. Prior works in security bug report
classification have had issues with the scarcity of vulnerability
data (specifically, such incidents occur very rarely). In a recent
TSE’18 paper, Peters et al. proposed some novel filtering
algorithms to help improve security bug report classification.
This paper reproduced those FARSEC results to show that, yes
indeed, such filtering can improve bug report classification.
Our experiments also show that we can do better than
FARSEC using hyperparameter optimization of learners and
data pre-processors. Of those two approaches, our results show
that it is more advantageous to improve the data-processor than
the learner. Hence, in the future, we strongly recommend the
use of hyperparameter optimization for improving data pre-
processing for software bug report classification.
In closing, we feel it important to repeat and emphasize
some advice offered earlier in this paper. Data mining algo-
rithms should be assessed on the kinds of data they might see
in the future. That is, data miners should be tested on data
that has naturally occurring class distributions. Hence, while
applying SMOTUNED (or SMOTE) to the training data is
good practice, it is a bad practice to apply such pre-processing
to the testing data.
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